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trustee's duties, the only safe means of changing an insecure investment left so by the creator of the trust, is to make the change
under the direction of the proper court, and if done without such
authority, the trustee will be liable to the cestui que trust for breach
of trust.
III. Where there is no such power of sale and the trustee leaves
unchanged an investment made by the testator and loss ensues, he
will generally be protected, if acting with bonafides, even in cases
where if there had been a power of sale and he had neglected to
sell, lie would have been liable under Rule I., laid down above.
IV. Where a bank or other corporation permits a trustee holding
certificates of its stock, transferable only by one of its officers, and
on which the name of the legal owner appears as trustee for another,
to part with that stock, and no remedy can be enforced against the
tristee, the corporation is held to have constructive notice of the
contents of the instrument creating the trust, and if the trustee has
exceeded his powers or in any way committed a breach of trust
with the involuntary aid of the corporation, the latter will be held
liable to the same extent as the trustee.
V. Executors and administrators have virtute officii a power
to sell the estate of the decedent, and unless they have become trustees by the length of time which has elapsed since the conclusion
of all of the duties of the office of executor, a corporation permitting a transfer at their instance would not, without notice and if
acting with bona fides, be held liable therefor.
A. S. B.
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Bank directors will be held responsible to the depositors for the loss or conversion by the bank of special deposits in such bank, whenever they know of such
conversion, or might have known of it by the exercise of such care and diligence as
the law requires of such officers in representing the affairs of the bank.
Bank directors must be considered as affected with the knowledge of such facts
as appear upon the bank books.

TI first case was an appeal from the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court, and the latter from that of the Warren Court
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of Common Pleas, but as the questions involved were almost
identical, they were for convenience considered and determined
together. The facts appear in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
LINDSAY, J.-To each of the petitions a general demurrer was
sustained, and the parties failing to plead further, judgments were
rendered dismissing them absolutely, and we are now called upon
to determine whether said petition set out facts constituting causes
of action.
From them it appears that in the year 1865, the Bank of
Bowling Green went into operation under a charter approved June
2d 1865, and that during the time it continued in business the
defendants were members of its board of directors; and further,
that before the institution of these actions said bank, upon the
petition of the defendants, or some of them, had been declared a
bankrupt by proper legal proceedings and was insolvent.
The Society of Shakers allege that on the 22d of February 1869,
its agent, U. E. Johns, deposited with the bank on special deposit
$72,450 in bonds, fully described in a memorandum incorporated
into the petition, and that the bank had failed upon demand to
return $55,660.40 of said bonds, also that it had failed to account
for $9702.63, collected on interest-coupons attached thereto.
Da'enport alleges that on the 3d of March 1866, he placed in
the bank on special deposit nine Warren county bonds of $1000
each, which, by reason of the premium for which they would sell
in the market, were of the value of $11,500, and that the bank
had failed upon demand to return all or any of such bonds.
The Society of Shakers charge the conversion of its bonds in the
following language: "Plaintiffs state that all the aforementioned
bonds, aggregating in value the sum of $55,660.40, were wrongfully taken from plaintiffs' package of special deposit by the officers
of the Bank of Bowling Green, and by them converted to the use
and emolument of said bank by sale as aforesaid, without right or
authority from these plaintiffs, or any of them, and of such wrongful
clinversion and appropriation defendants, and each of them, had
or could have had, by the most ordinary diligence and investigation,
ample notice."
Davenport alleges that his bonds had been "wrongfully appropriated by said Bank of Bowling Green and converted to the use
and emolument of said bank, forwarded to its regular correspondents,
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and by tleii sold and the proceeds ofsale credited to tle Bank of
Bowling Green, and paid on checks or drafts of said bank, of all of
which defeindants, and each of them, had notice as well from the
ledgers, books and accounts of said lank. as from its corresolndenee, reconcilements and statemn(nts."
And further, " that
said bonds were wrongfully appropriated as afbresaid to the use
and b]nefit of said bank, and witlhout authority from this plaintiff,
an,l that of such wrongful conversion and appropriation, defendants
and each of them, had, or could have had, by tle most ordinary
dili gence, ample notiice." It is also substantially charged in each
petition that the defendants, acting as directors, "did, on various
occasions, declare dividends when the condition of the bank did
not justify the same, and so appropriated to themselves, they being
the largest stockholders, large sums of money actually realized
friom the conversion of tile plaintiff's property as aforesaid."
Upon the faets as thus stated, this court must determine whether
or not appellees, or any of them, are personally bound to make
good the losses resulting to appellants from tile unauthorized and
wrongful conversion by the bank of their special deposits.
In tile adjudication of these causes, it is not necessary that we
shall critically inquire into the duties and obligations resting upon
bank directors to look after and protect the interest of Special
depositors, from whom the corporation represented by the directory
received no compensation.

It is sufficient to say, that special deposits are mere naked bailments, and that neither the bank nor its directory undertake to
exercise any greater care in their preservation than the depositor
has the reasonable right to suppose is exercised in keeping the
bank's property of like description.
It cannot be doubted, however, that if the deposit is lost by
reason of the gross negligence, or the wilful inattention, of the'

directors, the bank is responsible therefor, upon the well established doctrine that a mere depositary is liable for gross negligence;
and as the directory is tle corporate government of the bank, and
in the legal sense is the corporation itself, the negligence or inattention of its members can and ought to be imputed to the bank.
But the liability of the bank in these actions does not depend
alone upon the averue.,t of want of care and fidelity upon the
part of the directors.
It is specifically charged that the deposits were sold by its offi-
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cers and the proceeds thereof converted to its use and emolument
with the knowledge of the directors.
The facts thus alleged imply the conversion by the bailee of the
bailor's goods, for which, at the common law, an action of trover
would lie.
The question here presenting itself for our decision is, whether
the directors, who had knowledge of these alleged wrongfil sales,
can be held to answer personally for the deposits so converted.
Appellees insist that they cannot be so held, because of the
want of privity between the depositors and themselves. They
concede that for gross negligence or mismanagement upon their
part, resulting in loss to the bank, they may be held to account to
it, but urge that in so much as their undertaking was to the corporation, they can be proceeded against by it alone, and that these
appellants must look to the bank and not to them.
This position is plausible, but it cannot in our opinion be maintained. Bank directors are not mere agents, like cashiers, tellers
and clerks; they are trustees for the stockholders, and as to those
dealing with the bank. They not only act for it and in its name,
but in a qualified sense are the bank itself. It is the duty of the
board to exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the
bank. and to direct and control the action of its subordinate officers in all important transactions. The community have the right
to assume that the directory does its duty, and to hold them personally liable for neglecting it: Morse on Banking 76, 77. Their
contract is not alone with the bank. They invite the public to
deal with the corporation, and when any one accepts their invitation, he has the right to expect reasonable diligence and good
faith at their bands, and if they fail in either the.y violate a duty
they owe not only to the stockholders, but to the creditors and
patrons of the corporation. todges v. NYew EnglandScrew Company, 1 Rhode Island 312. An honest administration of the
affairs of the bank, and slight diligence at least in preventing
special deposits from being wrongfully converted to its use, were
legal duties which these directors were under obligations to the
special depositors to perform, and as these obligations grew out of
their implied contract that they would perform such duties, there
is a legal privity between the parties. This doctrine was recognised by this court in the case of the Lexington and Ohio Railroad Company v. Bridges, 7 B. Monroe 556, in which case it was
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held that the directors of that corporation, by accepting their
positions, assumed the discharge of certain duties not only to the
company, but to persons dealing with it, and that if they misappropriated the funds intrusted to their control and a creditor was
damaged by the act, he had a right of action against them for
the injury resulting from their illegal conduct. Whenever there
exists a legal duty to perform or omit to do an act, the law will
imply a promise by the person upon whom the duty rests, that he
will discharge it, and between him and all persons having the legal
riht to demand its performance a privity of contract exists:
Chitty on Contracts 1; Parsons on Contracts.
The right to recover in these actions does not rest alone upon
the contract of bailment with the bank, and the implied contract
resulting therefrom that the directors would not, by gross negligence
or tacit acquiescence, permit the deposits to be converted by the bank.
The petitions disclose a state of facts constituting an unlawful
conversion of personal property by the bailor, and also such conduct upon the part of appellees, as makes them parties to the tort
committed by their principal. It is immaterial whether or not an
action of trover will lie against the directors, as well as against the
bank. If they have been guilty of a breach of duty amounting to
a tort, they may be held to account, although they cannot be sued
jointly with the bank, in an action in the nature of trover and
conversion. Treating the bank as the bailee, and these appellees
as its mere agents, it is clear that if they directed the sale of the
deposits, or knowingly permitted them to be sold, they thereby became participants in the wrong.
"To maintain trover the defendant must have converted the
property to his own use, or have done some other act with a wrongful intent, expressed or implied." Hilliard on Torts, vol. 2, ch.
16, sect. 8, p. 284.
If one person disposes of the goods of another for the benefit of
a third person, this is a conversion: Bacon's Abr., tit. Trover,
sub. B.
"Every unlawful intermeddling with the goods of another is a
conversion, it being a disposition pro tanto of the goods of another,
as if they were the goods of the intermeddler :" Bac. Abr.; also,
Young v. _lfoore, 7 J. J. Marshall 647.
In the well-considered case of Pool v. Atkison et al., 1 Dana 110,
it was held that the agent who disposed of the slaves of another in
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obedience to the instructions of his employer, acting in good faith,
and ignorant of the complainant's rights, was nevertheless liable to
the true owner, and in the learned dissenting opinion it was not
argued that his liability would have been an open question, had he
acted in the matter with knowledge of the fact that the slaves were,
at the time, the property of the party suing instead of his employer.
These appellants allege that their bonds were sold by the officers
of the bank. and the proceeds paid out in the satisfaction of claims
against it, and in the payment of dividends to the stockholders, and
that of all this appellees had notice.
Having notice, it was their duty, and they had full power in the
premises, to prevent the sales. Failing in this, their subsequent
action in directing the proceeds, or some portion thereof, to be paid
out in the shape of dividends to the stockholders, including themselves, was a ratification of the -conversionwhich they had theretofore wrongfully permitted.
Considering their alleged wilful failure to discharge a plain duty,
their ratification of the unauthorized sale and the appropriation to
themselves of portions of the proceeds arising therefrom, there seems
to be no valid reason, even under the rules of pleading at the common law, why they might not be held liable with the bank in an
action of trover and conversion, but if there be well-founded doubt
as to this conclusion, an action on the case would undoubtedly lie,
to compel them to make good a loss resulting from a palpable failure upon their part to discharge a plain legal duty, the perforinance of which the complainants had the right to demand at their
hands, and the non-performance of which was the direct and immediate cause of the loss.
It follows, therefore, that each of the two petitions under consideration sets .out facts constituting causes of action, and this being
the case under our rules of civil procedure, the general demurrer
should have been overruled.
In said petitions we have stated the facts on which the legal obligations of appellees arose, the nature of the obligation, the breach
of it, and the damages resulting froin that breach. The petitions
are good according to the strictest rules of common law pleadings.
Chitty on Pleadings 136.
It is further objected that the allegation of notice is so far qualified as to render insufficient the averment of its existence. It is
stated that appellees "and each of them, had or could have had,
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by the use of the most ordinary diligence and investigation,
ample notice." It is also alleged by Davenport that they each
"had notice as well from the ledgers, books anra accounts of said
bank as from its correspondence,, reconcilements and statements."
It is the duty of bank directors to use ordinary diligence to acquaint themselves with the business of the bank, and whatever information might be acquired by ordinary attention to their duties,
they must, in controversies with persons transacting business with
the bank, be presumed to have. They cannot be heard to say that
they were not apprised of facts shown to exist by the ledgers, books,
accounts, correspondence, reconcilements and statements of the
bank, and which would have come to their knowledge except for
their gross neglect or inattention.
It is not necessary in many cases to show directly that the directors actually had their attention called to the mismanagement
of the affairs of the bank, or to the misconduct of the subordinate
officers. It is sufficient to show that the evidences of the mismanagement, or misconduct, were such that it must have been brought
to their knowledge, unless they were grossly negligent or wilfully
careless in the discharge of their duties. If it shall turn out upon
the trial of these actions that the ledgers, books, &c., of the bank
showed the special deposits of these appellees were being sold, and
that this fact would have been discovered by appellees by the use
of ordinary diligence, then the presumption of actual knowledge
will arise. It follows, therefore, that the allegation of notice is
sufficient.
It is further insisted in the case of the United Society of
Shakers, that it is manifest that all the defendants are not liable
and that by reason of the misjoinder of parties defendant, the
general demurrer was properly sustained.
An examination of section 120 of the Civil Code of Practice,
will show that the improper joinder of parties defendant is not a
ground for general demurrer, and under the 144th section of the
New York Code, which is similar to section 120 of our own, the
courts of that state have so held: The People v. Mayor of rw
York, 28 Barb. 240. The objection may be made available either
by a rule requiring the appellant to elect which of the defendants
it will proceed against, or by proper instruction by the court
when the case goes to the jury. The case of Hawkins v. Phythian,
8 B. Tvonroe 515, does not authorize the deduction that because
VOL. XXII.-15
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there is a different and higher degree of diligence required of the
president than of the other directors of the bank, they cannot be
jointly sued in these actions.
In the case cited the declaration did not show that the injury
complained of resulted from the joint act of the defendants, as is

alleged in these eases. The judgments sustaining the general demurrers and dismissing the two petitions must be reversed.
The two causes are remanded, with instructions to overrule
the general demurrers, and for further proceedings in each case
conformable to the principles of this opinion.
We have examined the foregoing with
some care, and feel some reluctance to
dissent from any of its conclusions, since
its general purpose is so much in the
interest of good order and faithful administration in all the departments of
Iusiness, and especially of official trust.
But it seems to us, that even so desirable
an end as this, may be attained by too
great sacrifice or disregard of established
legal principles.
The general proposition stated in the
first bead-note may be regarded as
unexceptionable in terms, but we shall
see hereafter that its application to this
case is more questionable. And when
the case is fully examined, it will
appear that this first proposition rests
wholly, so. far as this case goes, upon
the second proposition in the headnotes, and that this latter is not entirely tenable, when judged of fairly.
by the established customs and course
of business in-such institutions. The
opinion in one place assumes, that the
case shows an assent on the part of the
directors to the conversion, which would
make the case most unquestionable for
the appellants. For there can be no
doubt, that any one having the legal
control, as directors of a hank have over
-the conduct of the subordinate officers
and servants in the employ of 'the bank,
-will render himself personally responsible for any tort committed by such
subordinate officers and servants, while

acting under the advice or consent of
such directors. All principle and anthority confirm this. But it seems to
us the case stated in the opinion will not
bear this construction.
The case being tried on demurrer will
rest upon the legal force of the averments in the complaint.
And these, astated in the opinion, arc only, that the
appellees, "and each of them had, or
could have had, by the use of the mo-t
ordinary diligence anl investigation,
ample notice." As this is an averment
in the pleadings of the appellants, it
must receive the least favorable construction toxt'ards them. In that view it
imports, not that the appellees had notice.
but that they might have obtained notice
by proper investigation. And by looking
into the averment in one of the cases.
we find what thi notice consisted in:
"had notice, as well from the ledger.
hooks and accounts of said hank, as froit
its correspondence, reconcilements anI
statements." This imports on the proper
construction towards the pleader, that if
the appellees had examined all these
sources of information they would have
discovered, that the bank, by their tellers
and cashier, had put these bonds to their
own use. But this only implies a notive
after the fact of conversion, since the
avails would only appear upon the books,
probably, when converted into money.
But that is not important here.
But upon the most favorable construe-
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tion for the appellant, tlhese aernients
can imply nothing more than that the
appellees were deficient in the exercise
of the proper degree of care aindi diligence ill the matter. But if' any pritciple in the la- of huincss corporations
i.; entirely well settled, it is that the
creditors of such corporations have no
right of action again-t the ollicers for
in-!re omi-ioa of dlut y-cre nonofeasance. Such delanits are only hreaches
of obligation towards the corporation in
which its creditors have no actionable
intcret. In the case of special deposits
in a bank, the corporation is the dcpo-itary and not the oflicer receiving the
,;linte:
oistr v. A'ssex Jank, 17 TIast.
479. There i-; thus no privily by way of
contract, or duty, created between the
depositary andiany of tite officers of the
bank. It is competent for banks to
receive the special deposits of their custonters, but they are not obliged to do so
whenever requested : lhatcher v. State
Bank, 5 Saudf. Ch. 121. The batik in
the case of special deposits are only
gratuitous bailets, owing the lowest degree of care. Such deposits are not
usually entered tipu tile books, or
certified to the depositor, but there are
probably different practices in regard to
this. The directors of a battk would
not ordinarily know mitct in regard to
suclh deposit, and couli scarcely ie expecled to keep any lookout in regard to
them. The president might know more
than the ordinary directors, lut even lie
could scarcely be considered as owing
ally special duty, and if lie dil, it would
be to the bank and not the depositor.
The cashier and tellers would naturally
have the entire charge of such deposits,
and their duty to tile batik would extend
only to seeing that they were not needlessly exposed to loss or damage, and
no duty from such officers would be due
the depositor.
But, as said in 1'oster v. Essex Bank,
saupra, it would be a breach of trust for

tite hank or tiny of its oflicers to open a
package left otn special deposit, and
whoever did or counselled such act
would be responsiile to the owner for
such tort. And if done by atn officer of
the bank for its use and benefit, there call

be no doubt the battk wold be responsible, int we think tite batik woul now
be held responsihc, it such case, whether
tile avails went to its own u.e or not.
The contrary was bel! in Foster v. Essex
Bank, but tile oli idea that corporations
were not responsible for the wilful act
of their servants, is now nearly abandolled, and the more sensible rule
adopted, that corporations are responsible for all acts of their servants within
the range of their employment.
We have reviewed the cases upon this
question iii I Railways, P 130, pp. 532542. One of the latest English cases ott
the point is Bturns v. Poulson, L. R. 8 C.
P. 563. See also il'arrd v. Londo Omnibus Co. 27 L. T. N. S. 761. In the late
case of Siift v. 17nterbotham, L. R. 8 Q.
B3.244, it was held that a bank is responsible for the willfully wrong act of its
servant committed in fle course of his
employment. But it is not important
to discuss this point here. The books
all show, that such officers anl servants
are liable to the owner of such special
deposit, for their own wilful acts, but not
for mere negligenice in the discharge of
their duty to the bank, although the depositor may suffer an incidental loss
thtercby : liatli v. Nje, t0 Cash 416 ;
Angell & Atties ott Corp. a 241
et seq. ; Story on Agency, chap. XII.
. 308 et seq. ; Mr. Jlt.tice STonr
thus states the rule : " le [the agent]
is not in general (for there are exceptions), [referring to cases of maritime
contracts], liable to third persons for
his own nonfeasatices, or omissions
of duty in the course of Il; employment. iis liability iu these latter cases
is solely to his principal. The early cases
of McManus v. Crickett, 1 East 106 ;
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Ellis v. Turner, 8 T. R. 531 ; Foster v.
Essex Bank, Supra, and Mechanics' Bank
v. The Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326,
and some others,wherein it has been held
that the master is not responsible for any
wilful act of his servant, since that is,
ipso facto, a departure from the employment, may be said to have a kind
or half-dying existence still. But the
introduction of railways has compelled
the courts to hold corporations responsible for all acts of theirservants, however
wilful, provided they come fairly within the range of the employment, and
are professedly done on behalf of such
corporations. And negligence is not inferrible from the loss merely; the burden
of proof of negligence rests on the
plaintiff: Smith v. Bank-, 99 Mass. 605.
But here the persons performing the
wrongful acts complained of were, in
no sense, the servants of the appellees.
They were the servants of the bank, as
much as any servants employed under
the supervision of a superintendent are
the servants of the common master.
It would present a novelty in jurisprudence to hold the general superintendent
of works personally responsible for the
acts of his subordinates to those dealing
with the owner, upon the ground that lie
did not restrain such subordinates from
dereliction of duty. But that, in principle, is this case. And we cannot suppose, if the bank were still solvent, any
one would dream of maintaining this
action. And most of the bad law is
made in this same way, by attempting
to hold some one responsible, not originally in privity with the plaintiff. Upon

the merits of the cae, Gil,bbin v. !,3ullen, L. RI. 2 ]'riv. Council 317, seems
a full authoritv for the defendants, even
if the action were against the bank.
It is fair to say, that sone of the
testimony declared upon in thi.; case,
for it seems to le rather a declaration
upon the testimony than upon its legal
results, would no (douht le regarded as
competent to le given to the jury, n;
tending to prove the appellees cognisant
of, and consenting to the converqion.
But the declaration is not placed upon
that ground, but rather upon the ground
that the appellees are to le held responsible for not more carefully inspecting the affairs of the bank. In this
view we bave, we suppose, sufficiently
shown the suit cannot be maintained.
We appreciate, of course, the high
sense of justice implied in holding, not
only the bank, hut even the directors
responsible for all the wrongful acts of
the subordinate officers and servants of
the bank. But if this is to Ile done by
a kind of blind instinct of justice, regardless of established legal principles,
it will, in the end, destroy all sense of
security in public functionaries, and thus
drive honest men out of such places.
There might be a kind of moral justice
in holding the bank, and even its directors, responsible for all wrongful acts of
its servants performed uithin the bank-.
building, even by rohbery or theft, but
no one will vindicate such a course.
And the same is equally true of all
claim by special dipositors against the
directors, on the ground of negligence
I. F. It.
merely.

Supreme Court of the United States.
BARTEMEYER v. TIE STATE OF IOWA.
The usual and ordinary legislation of the states regulating or prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquors raises no question under the Constitution of the United
States prior to the fourteenth amendment of that instrument.
The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges and immuni-
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ties of citizens of the United States which by that amendment the states were forbidden to abridge.
But if a case were presented in which a person owning liquor or other property
at the time a law was pas.-ed by the state absolutely prohibiting any sale of it, it
would be a very grave qae.rign1 whether such a law would not be inconsistent with
the provision of that amendmnt which forbids the state to deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due course of law.
While the case before us attempts to present that question, it fails to do it, because the plea, which is taken as true, does not state, in due form and by positive
allegation, the time when the defendant became the owner of the liquor sold; and,
secondly, because tle record satisfies us that this is a moot case, made up to obtain
the opinion of this court on a grave constitutional question, without the existence
of the ficts necessary to raise that question.
In such a ease, where the Supreme Court of the state to which the writ of error
is directed has not considered the question, this court does not feel at liberty to
go out of its usual course to decide it.
BA
0tEMYER, the plaintiff in error, was tried before a justice of
tle peace on the charge of selling intoxicating liquors, and acquitted. On an appeal to the Circuit Court of the state the defendatt filed the following plea :-

" And now comes the defendant, F. Bartemeyer, Sr., and for plea to
the information in this cause says: Ile admits that at the time and
plice mentined in said information he did sell and deliver to one Timothy Hickey one (1) glass'of intoxicating liquor called whiskey, and did
then and there receive pay in lawful money from said Hickey for the
same. But defendant alleges that he committed no crime known to the
hw by the selling of the intoxicating liquor hereinbefore described to
said Iickey, for the reason that he, the defendant, was the lawful owner,
holder and possessor, in the state of Iowa, of said property, to wit, said
one glass of ititoxicating liquor, sold as aforesaid to said Hickey, prior
to the day on which the law was passed under which these proceedings
are instituted and prosecuted. known as the net fior the suppression of
ittemperance, and being chapter sixty-four (64) of the revision of 1860:
and that,. prior to the passage of said act for the suppression of intemperatice, he was a citizen of the United States and of the state of Iowa."
Without any evidence whatever the ease was submitted to the
court, the parties waiving a jury, and a judgment was rendered
that the defendant was guilty as charged. A bill of exceptions
was taken and the case carried to the Supreme Court of Iowa,
and that court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and
rendered a judgment for costs against the present plaintiff in
error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILblR, J.-There is sufficient evidence that the main ground
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relied on to reverse the judgment in the Supreme Court of Iowa,
was, that the act of the Iowa legislature on which the prosecution
was based was in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The opinion of that court is in the record, and, so far as the
general idea is involved, that acts for suppressing the use of intoxicating drinks are opposed to that instrument, they content
themselves with a reference to the previous decisions of that court,
namely : Our 1house _.ro. 2 v. The State, 4 G. Greene 171 ; Zuntof
v. The State, 4 G. Greene 526 ; Santos v. The State, 2 Iowa 165.
But, referring to the allegation in the plea that the defendant was
the owner of the liquor sold before the passage of the act under
which he was prosecuted, they say that the transcript fails to show
that Ihe admissions and averments of the plea were all the evidence in the case, and that other testimony may have shown that
he did not so own and possess the liquor.
The case has been submitted to us on printed argument. That
on the part of the plaintiff in error has taken a very wide range,
and is largely composed of the arguments familiar to all, against
the right of the states to regulate traffic in intoxicating liquors.
So far as this argument deals with the mere question of regulating
this traffic, or even its total prohibition, as it may have been affected
by anything in the Federal Constitution prior to the recent amend7nents of that instrument, we do not propose to enter into a discussion. Up to that time it had been considered as falling within the
police regulations of the state, left to their judgment, and subject
to no other limitations than such as were imposed by the state
Constitution, or by the general principles supposed to limit all
legislative power. It has never been seriously contended that
such laws raised any questions growing out of the Constitution of
the United States.
But the case before us is supposed by the counsel of plaintiff in
error to present a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution, on the ground that the act of the Iowa legislature is
a violation of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States which that amendment declares shall not be abridged
by the states ; and that in his case it deprives him of his property
without due process of law.
As regards both branches of this defence, it is to be observed
that the statute of Iowa, which is complained of, was in existence
long before the amendment of the Federal Constitution, which is
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thus invoked to render it invalid. Whatever were the privileges
and immunities of Mr. Jlartemeyer, as they stood before that
amwlinet, under the Iowa statute, they have certainly not been
abridged by any action of the state legislature since that amendment became a part of the Constitution. And unless that amendment confers privileges anl immunities which he did not previously
possess, the argument fails. But the most liberal advocate of the
rights conferred by that amendment have contended for nothing
more than that the rights of the citizen previously existing, and
dependent wholly on state laws for their recognition, are now
placed under the protection of the Federal Government, ar.d are secured by the Federal Constitution. The weight of authority is
overwhelming that no such immunity has heretofore existed as
would prevent state legislatures from regulating and even prohibiting the traffic in intoxicating drinks, with a solitary exception.
That exception is the case of a law operating so rigidly on property in existence at the time of its passage, absolutely prohibiting its sale, as to amount to depriving the owner of his property.
A single case, that of JTgnehanzer v. The People, 3 Kernan
486, has held that as to such property the statute would be
void for that reason. But no case has held that such a law was
void as violating the privileges or immunities of citizens of a state
or of the United States. If, however, such a proposition is seriously urged, we think that the right to sell intoxicating liquors,
so far as such a right exists, is not one of the rights growing out
of citizenship of the United States, and in this regard the case
falls within the principles laid down by this court in The Slaughter-ifouse Cases, 16 Wallace.
But if it were true, and it was fairly presented to us, that the
defendant was the owner of the glass of intoxicating liquor which
lie sold to Iiekey, at the time that the state of Iowa first imposed
an absolute prohibition on the sale of such liquors, then we concede that two very grave questions would arise, namely: 1. Whether
this would be a statute depriving him of his property without due
process of law; and secondly, whether if it were so, it would be
so far a violation of the fourteenth amendment in that regard as
would call for judicial action by this court ?
Both of these questions, whenever they may be presented to us,
are of an importance to require the most careful and serious consideration. They are not to be lightly treated, nor are we author-
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ized to make any advances to meet them until we are required to
do so by the duties of our position.
In the case before us, the Supreme Court of Iowa, whose judgment we are called on to review, did not consider it. They said
that the record did not present it.
It is true the bill of exceptions, as it seems to us, does show
that defendant's plea was all the evidence given, but this does not
remove the difficulty in our minds. The plea states that defendant
was the owner of the glass of liquor sold prior to the passage of
the law under which the proceedings against him were instituted,
being chapter sixty-four of the revision of 1860.
If this is to be treated as an allegation that defendant was the
owner of that glass of liquor prior to 1860, it is insufficient, because the revision of the laws of Iowa of 1860 was not an enactment of new laws, but a revision of those previously enacted; and
there has been in existence in the state of Iowa, ever since the
code of 1851, a law strictly prohibiting the sale of such liquorsthe act in all essential particulars under which defendant was prosecuted, amended in some immaterial points. If it is supposed
that the averment is helped by the statement that he owned the
liquor before the laiw was passed, the answer is that this a mere
conclusion of law. le should have stated when be became the
owner of the liquor, or at least have fixed a date when he did own
it, and leave the court to decide when the law took effect, and
apply it to his case. But the plea itself is merely argumentative,
and does not state the ownership as a fact, but says he is not
guilty of any offence, because of such fact.
If it be said that this manner of looking at the case is narrow
and technical, we answer that the record affords to us on its face
the strongest reason to believe that it has been prepared from the
beginning for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of this court
on important constitutional questions without the actual existence
of the facts on which such questions can alone arise.
It is absurd to suppose that plaintiff, an ordinary retailer of
drinks, could have proved, if required, that he had owned that
particular glass of whiskey prior to the prohibitory liquor law of
1851.
The defendant, from his first appearance before the justice of
the peace to his final argument in the Supreme Court, asserted in
the record in various forms that the statute under which lie was
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prosecuted was a violation of the Constitution of the United
States. The act of the prosecuting attorney, under these circumstances, in going to trial without any replication or denial of the
plea. which was intended manifestly to raise that question, but
which carried on its face the strongest probability of its falsehood,
satisfies us that a moot case was deliberately made up to raise the
particular point when the real facts of the case would not have
done so. As the Supreme Court of Iowa did not consider this
question as raised by the record, and passed no opinion on it, we
do not feel at liberty, under all the circumstances, to pass on it on
this record.
The other errors assigned being found not t exist, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is affirmed.
JIRADLEY, J., concurring. -Whilst I concur in the conclusion
to which the court has arrived in this case, I think it proper to
state briefly and explicitly the grounds on which I distinguish it
from the 8laughter-house Cases, which were argued at the same
time. I prefer to do this in order that there may be no misapprehension of the views which I entertain in regard to the application of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
This was a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor, in Iowa,
contrary to a law of that state which prohibits the sale of such
liquor. The defendant pleaded that lie was the lawful owner of
the liquor in Iowa, ant a citizen of the United States prior to the
day on which the law was passed, being chapter 64 of the revision
of 1860. Judgment was given against the defendant on his plea.
The truth is, that the law in question was originally passed in
1851 and was incorporated into the revision of 1860, in the chapter
referred to in the plea. Whether the plea meant to assert that
the defendant owned the liquor prior to the passage of the original
law, or only prior to its re-enactment in the revision, is doubtful,
and, being doubtful, it must be interpreted most strongly against
the pleader. It amounts, therefore, only to an allegation that the
defendant became owner of the liquor at a time when it was unlawful to sell it in Iowa. The law, therefore, was not in this case
an invasion of property existing at the date of its passage, and
the question of depriving a person of property without due process
of law does not arise. No one has ever doubted that a legislature
may prohibit the vending of articles deemed injurious to the safety
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of society, provided it does not interfere with ve'tel rights of
property. When such rights stand in the way of the public good,
they can be removed by awarding compensation to the owner.
When they are not in question, the claim of a right to sell a prohibited article can never be deemed one of the privileges and immunities of the citizen. It is toto ecelo different from the right
not to be deprived of property without due process of law, or the
right to pursue such lawful avocation as a man chooses to adopt,
unrestricted by tyrannical and corrupt monopolies. By that portion
of the fourteenth amendment by which no state may make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, or take life, liberty or property
without due process of law, it has now become the fundamental law
of this country that life, liberty and property (which include
"the pursuit of happiness") are sacred rights which the Constitution of the United States guarantees to its humblest citizen against
oppressive legislation, whether national or local, so that lie cannot
be deprived of them without due process of law. The monopoly
created by the legislature of Louisiana, which was under consideration in the 8laughter-house Cases, was, in my judgment,
legislation of this sort and obnoxious to this objection. But police
regulations, intended for the preservation of the public health and
the public order, are of an entirely different character. So much of
the Louisiana law as partook of this character was never objected
to. It was the unconscionable monopoly, of which the police
regulation was a mere pretext, that was deemed by the dissenting
members of the court an invasion of the right of the citizen to.
pursue his lawful calling. A claim of right to pursue an unlawful
calling stands on very different grounds, occupying the same platform as does a claim of right to disregard license laws and to usurp
public franchises. It is greatly to be regretted, as it seems to me,
that this distinction was lost sight of (as I think it was)in the
decision of the court referred to.
I am authorized to say that Justices SWAYNE and FIELD concur
in this opinion.
FIELD, J., concurring.-I concur in the views expressed by Mr.
Justice BRADLEY, but will add a few observations.
I accept the statement made in the opinion of the court, that
the Act of Iowa of 1860, to which the plea of the defendant re-
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fers, was only a revision of the Act of 1851, and agree that, for
this reason, the averment of the ownership of the liquor sold prior
to the passage of the Act of 1860 did not answer the charge for
which the defendant was prosecuted. I have no doubt of the
power of the state to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors when
such regulation does not amount to the destruction of the right of
property in them. The right of property in an article involves
the power to sell and dispose of such article as well as to use and
enjoy it. Any act which declares that the owner shall neither sell
it or dispose of it, nor use and enjoy it, confiscates it, depriving
him of his property without due process of law. Against such
arbitrary legislation by any state the fourteenth amendment affords
protection. But the prohibition of sale in any way, or for any use,
is quite a different thing from a regulation of the sale or use so as
to protect the health and morals of the community. All property,
even the most harmless in its nature, is equally subject to the
power of the state in this respect with the most noxious.
No one has ever pretended, that I am aware of, that the fourteenth amendment interferes in any respect with the police power
of the state. Certainly no one who desires to give to that amendment its legitimate operation has ever asserted for it any such effect.
It was not adopted for any such purpose. The judges who dissented from the opinion of the majority of the court in the
,Slaugter-Irouse Cases never contended for any such position.
But, on the contrary, they recognised the power of the state in
its fullest extent, observing that it embraced all regulations affecting the health, good order, morals, peace and safety of society,
that all sorts of restrictions and burdens were imposed under it,
and that when these were not in conflict with any constitutional
prohibition or fundamental principles, they could not be successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal. But they said that under the
pretence of prescribing a police regulation the state could not be
permitted to encroach upon any of the just rights of the citizen,
which the Constitution intended to guard against abridgment; and
because, in their opinion, the act of Louisiana, then under consideration, went far beyond the province of a police regulation,
and created an oppressive and odious monopoly, thus directly impairing the common rights of the citizens of the state, they dissented from the judgment of the court.
They could not then, and do not now, see anything in the act
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which fell under the denomination of a police or sanitary regulation, except the provisions requiring the landing and slaughtering
of animals below the city of New Orleans and the inspection of
the animals before they were slaughtered; and of these provisions
no complaint was made. All else was a mere grant of special and
exclusive privileges. And it was incomprehensible to them then,
and it is incomprehensible to them. now, how, in a district of
country somewhat larger than the state of Rhode Island, and embracing a population of over two hundred thousand souls, any conditions of health or morals should require that the preparation
of animal food, a prime necessity of life, should be intrusted to a
single corporation for twenty-five years; or how in all that vast
district, embracing eleven hundred and fifty-four square miles,
there could be only one locality and one building in which animals
could with safety to the public health be sheltered and slaughtered.
And with all the light shed upon the subject by the elaborate
opinion of the majority, they do not yet understand that it bemongs
to the police power of any state to require the owner of animals
to give to the butcher a portion of each animal slaughtered. If
the state can say the owner shall give the horns and the hoofs, it
may say he shall give the hide and the tallow, or any part of the
animal. It may say that the butcher shall retain the four quarters
and return to the owner only the head and the feet. The owner
may require the very portions he is compelled to surrender for his
own business-the horns, for example, for the manufacture of
combs, and the hoofs for the manufacture of glue, and other portions for equally useful purposes.
It was because the act of Louisiana transcended the limits of
police regulation, and asserted a power in the state to farm out the
ordinary avocations of life, that dissent was made to the judgment
of the court sustaining the validity of the act.
It was believed that the fourteenth amendment had taken away
the power of the state to parcel out to favored citizens the ordinary
trades and callings of life, to give to A. the sole right to bake
bread; to B. the sole right to make hats; to C. the sole right to
sow grain or plough the fields ; and thus at discretion, to grant to
some the means of livelihood and withhold it from others. It was
supposed that there were no privileges or immunities of citizens
more sacred than those which are involved in the right to "the
pursuit of happiness," which is usually classed with life and
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liberty; and that in the pursiut o" ivippi, ess, since that amendinent became part of the fundainental law, every one was free to
fo~llow a, v lawfJl employment without other restraint than such as
equally afflects all other persons.

Bebre this amendinent and the thirteenth amendment were
adopted, the states had supreme authority over all these matter-.
and the national government, except in a few particulars, could
afford no protection to the individual against arbitrary and oppressive legislation. After the civil war had closed the same authority was asserted and, in the states recently in insurrection, was
exercised to the oppression of the freedmen; and towards citizens
of the North seeking residence there, or citizens resident there
who had maintained their loyalty during the war for nationality, a
feeling of jealousy and dislike existed which could not fail soon to
It
find. expression in discriminating and hostile legislation.
was to prevent the possibility of such legislation in future,
and its enforcement where already adopted, that the fourteenth
amendment was enacted. Itgrew out of the feeling that a union
which had been maintained by such costly sacrifices was after all
worthless if a citizen could not be protected in all his fundamental
rights everywhere-north and south, east and west-throughout
the limits of the Republic. The amendment was not, as held
in the opinion of the majority, primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro race. It had a much broader purpose; it
was intended to justify legislation, extending the protection
of the national government over the common rights of all
citizens of the United States, and thus obviate objections to
the legislation adopted for the protection of the emancipated race.
It was intended to make it possible for all persons, which necessarily included those of every race and color, to live in peace and
Its
security wherever the jurisdiction of the nation reached.
therefore recognised, if it did not create, a national citizenship,
and made all persons citizens except those who preferred to remain under the protection of a foreign government; and declared
that their privileges and immunities, which embrace the fundamental rights belonging to citizens of all free governments, should
not be abridged by any state. This national citizenship is primary
and not secondary. It clothes its possessor, or would do so if not
shorn of its efficiency by construction, with the right, when his
privileges and immunities are iniaded by partial and discriminating
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legislation, to appeal from his state to his nation, and gives him the
assurance that, for his protection, lie can invoke the whole power
of the government.
This case was considered by the court in connection with the
Slaughter-touse Cases, although its decision 'has been so long delayed. I have felt, therefore, called upon to point out the distinction between this case and those cases, and as there has been
some apparent misapprehension of the views of the dissenting
judges, to restate the grounds of their dissent.

Supreme Court qf Atiehlgan.
BENJAMIN ATWOOD v. YALENTINE CORNWALL.
The opinions of persons not witnesses through whose hands a treasury note has
passed, as to its genuineness, are not admissible in evidence in a suit brought by
one who has taken such note to recover its value.
The statement of a fact by one of the parties, ;n the presence of the other and
not denied, is admissible as evidence of the fact so stated.
Bankers are competent to testify as to the genuineness of a treasury note.
The taker of counterfeit coin, or paper-money which has been made legal
tender by law, must use due diligence to ascertain its character and to notify the
giver, to entitle him to recover its value.
Any unnecessary delay beyond such reasonable time as would enable the taker
to inform himself as to its genuineness, acts as a fraul on the giver and prevents
a recovery.
Whether the rule, " that a party passing negotiable paper warrants its genuineness," is applicable to payments made in coin or legal-tender notes. Q1ucre?

ERROR to Kalamazoo Circuit.

Cornwall sued Atwood before a justice of the peace to recover
back fifty dollars, which lie claimed as the amount of a counterfeit bill, received of Atwood on a balance of account. Judgment
having been rendered for defendant before the justice, Cornwall
appealed to the Circuit, where le recovered against Atwood, who
now brings error. The evidence showed that the settlement was
made March 4th 1867, and that Cornwall returned the $50
bill now claimed to be counterfeit to Atwood August 9th 1867.
Upon the trial questions arose whether any such bill was paid to
Cornwall by Atwood, as well as whether the bill was identified,
and was counterfeit, and whether the delay should affect the rights
of the parties. Also, there were objections made to the admission
and rejection of evidence.
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There was evidence given tending to show that Cornwall transferred the note in question to one Kellogg, who, on the same day
or immediately thereafter, returned it. Cornwall was allowed to
testify that Kellogg when he returned it said it was bad. Kellogg
was allowed to state his conversation with Mr. Brees, a banker
with whom he deposited it.
Edwards &JSherwood, for plaintiff in error.
Balch, Howard & Balch, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMP ELL, J.-The only questions material to the issue, which
were touched upon by this evidence, were the identity and the genuineness of the bill in question. Identity could only be made out by
tracing the bill through the various hands into which it had been
passed. Genuineness could only be determined by evidence on
the trial. To prove identity it was only necessary to show the
transfer from Atwood to Cornwall, Cornwall to Kellogg, Kellogg
to Sheldon & Co. (of whom Brees was a partner), and back from
these various parties to Atwood. The conversations and opinions
of any of them were foreign to the subject of identification, and
could not be lawful evidence of the bad character of the note.
They were not legitimate for any purpose, and had a direct tendency to lead the jury to assume the bill was counterfeit, from
mere hearsay. The fact that several persons had so treated it
could not fail to impress them, although all of these acted on one
man's opinion, who was not sworn in the cause. Kellogg's claiming it to be bad was perhaps so connected with the res gesta that it
might be received with a proper caution to the jury that it was no
evidence of the fact, that it was counterfeit. But his statements
as to what was told him by others are not within that rule. This
testimony ought to have been excluded.
It is also difficult to perceive any pertinence in the testimony
allowed to be introduced, that on the trial before the justice, Atwood
produced a genuine bill. It does not appear that he did it as a
witness, nor that lie made any admissions or statements in regard
to it. He bad a right to take any proper measures to test the
memory and honesty of Cornwall, who was seeking to cast a
liability on him as having passed a bad bill; and as the question
of identification was throughout a very important one, the course
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alleged to have been taken before the justice was in no way reprehensible, and was not a proper subject of proof as such at the
circuit.
The justice who tried the cause below gave testimony as to
various conversations between the parties in his presence. This
testimony was in the form of a written statement which the parties
admitted contained such facts as he would swear to if put on the
stand. His statement contained the following clause, which was
ruled out as inadmissible. "Atwood said to him, you did not take
the number of the bill until after you tried to get me to take it;
and Cornwall did not deny it. I understood him to admit that he
(lid not take the number of the bill until after be carried it back
to Atwood."
The time when Cornwall took down the number of the bill was
very material. It was the only mark by which lie claimed to
identify it. If not taken down before its delivery to Atwood, the
question of identity was left very much in doubt. The record
contains no other proof definitely and positively connecting that
bill with the one paid over to Kellogg and deposited with Sheldon
& Co. Cornwall on his cross-examination admitted that he took
down the number when lie returned it to Atwood, and there was
room for -an argument upon a comparison of that with his direct
testimony on the same subject. If lie admitted that fact in a conversation with Atwood, or if when conversing fully on the subject
lie did not deny it when asserted, this was pertinent and should
have been received. The statement of the justice that lie understood Cornwall to admit the fict is not given as an expression of
opinion, but as a fact, and is the only way in which conversations
can often be proven. If obscure, it could have been made clear by
further statement or cross-examination. Where counsel, to avoid
the necessity of having a witness called, admit what lie would
testify to, they cannot be permitted to rely on refined distinctions
which could have been obviated by a fuller examination.
We see no error in allowing the character of the noite to he
shown by bankers. It would be impracticable to obtain the
testimony of the treasury officers on all occasions, and those who
are in the habit of handling money constantly become sufficiently
skilled to detect from its appearance, with some degree of certainty,
whether it is genuine. This knowledge is not necessarily obtained
from seeing other bills of the same series, or even of the same
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denomination, although a person who has not seen $50 bills must
have had a very limited experience in banking. It is well understood that counterfeits are oftener detected from general appearances not easy to be explained, than fi'om any investigation of
letters and numbers. The knowledge shown in the case before us
was sufficiently general to show the witness ought to have been
able to give an opinion on the note in question. It was a legal
tender, with which all persons are expected to have some acquaintance. The rule as to proof of counterfeits, which has been
enforced in criminal prosecutions, would always have allowed such
testimony, and we think it was- properly received.
A more important question, however, arises concerning the relative duties and liabilities of parties who honestly receive and pay
out counterfeit money.
The general current of authority appears to sustain the position
that a person passing negotiable paper warrants its genuineness to
such an extent that he is bound to make it good if found bad, and
returned within a proper time. But where paper is genuine but
worthless, although not supposed to be so by either party, the
authorities are in conflict as to such liability and its extent. The
decisions applied to bank-notes have all gone upon the analogy
of ordinary negotiable securities. There is no modern .decision
which we have been able to find, which draws any line in dealing
with payments in counterfeits or refers specially to that coin or
paper which the law deals with as money-receivable not by currency merely, and by consent, but by statute and by obligation.
The decisions, in giving reasons for their results, were originally
based on the doctrine that payments by negotiable paper were in a
measure conditional, and not absolute in all cases, but dependent
on the possibility of getting payment by diligence. And the distinction between counteifeit and otherwise valueless paper has not
always been kept up, nor always well defined. See authorities in
Story on Cont. § 411; Edwards on Bills 205-6-7, and notes.
The decisions, however, agree generally that a party who would
otherwise be able to recover bick the amount of bad money passed
upon him, will be debarred of his action by lack of diligence.
And it is much to be regretted that upon the whole subject there
are more dictathan decisions. It is necessary, in order to discover
the real difficulties of the matter, to consider how the doctrines
bear practically on the business of the community.
VOL. XXII.-16

ATWOOD v. CORNWALL.

The paper which is in controversy, is for all legal purposes of
currency on a similar footing with coin; that is to say, it is a legal
tender, and all creditors are compelled to receive it in payment.
They do not exercise an option in taking it, as they do in receiving other paper. Inasmuch as they refuse a tender at their
peril, the law assumes, and business must be done on the basis,
that every business man will become generally familiar with the
appearance of the money of the country, so as to be able to
exercise a judgment upon it. And while those who are constantly
handling money in banks and exchange offices cultivate their faculties more thoroughly in a knowledge of currency, all persons are
supposed to have some such knowledge, sufficient to enable them
to do business with ordinary security. And it is not to be expected
that among ordinary dealers one will have any great advantage
over others; while all have means of access, in every community,
to some persons who have by their peculiar experience the means
of aiding the judgment of those of less experience.
It is not customary, and cannot be expected, that persons will
note down all the bills which they receive, and put ear-marks on
them, so that they can recall the persons from whom they are received. iNothing would have a surer tendency to hinder the negotiability of genuine bills than such ear-marks; while the delay
and trouble of doing so would be a great hindrance to the despatch
of business. Most currency gets into circulation through the
medium of banks, and other instrumentalities capable of detecting
bad money; and where counterfeit money is circulated, it is
usually uttered in such quarters as to render it difficult, if not impossible, to trace it back to its source. The innocent taker of such
paper is not generally guilty of any culpable negligence; and between several successive takers it is impossible to hold one any
-more in fault than the rest, for not detecting the cheat. It is
'often nothing but a suspicion of forgery that induces a taker to
notice from whom he receives a particular bill; and where this
.suspicion is entertained, and not communicated to the person from
whom the paper is received, its concealment may easily operate
as a fraud upon him, by preventing him from tracing it back.
This would create a strong moral equity in his favor, whatever the
law may determine in regard to it.
At common law, such authority as we have seems to indicate
that, as between two innocent parties, the taker of counterfeit coin
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cannot claim recourse against him from whom he took it: Shep.
Touch. 140; 71ade's Oase, 5 Co. 114. This must have been on
the ground already referred to, that parties in equal equity shall
not be disturbed. The common law and equity are both full of
instances where persons dealing honestly on an equal footing and
-with equal means of knowledge, are left where their dealings have
placcd them, neither having recourse against the other to undo
their agreements or transactions. And while in i_1arkle v. Iratfield,
2 J. R. 455, KENT, C. J., doubts the propriety of the doctrine, the
case called for no such doubts, and no decisions were found shaking it. It cannot be denied that there is much force in the doctrine
which requires a party to be vigilant before taking bad money.
That, after all, is the only rule likely to prevent its circulation.
A person who takes it without dispute and examines it afterwards,
if he is able to remember from whom he took it, and is allowed to
recover back the amount, may save himself, but will usually subject
an equally innocent party to loss. And it is also manifest that if
he is ready to testify positively from whom he received it, his
adversary cannot generally be as certain whether or no he paid it
out, and cannot by his own oath alone, even if he is certain, convict a false witness of perjury. It will never do, in laying down
rules, to overlook the consequences.
If the rule of liability is to be enforced, it cannot be Justly enforced without requiring a degree of vigilance conforming to the
occasion. If payment in what is supposed to be legal-tender
paper is to be regarded as contingent and not absolute, the receiver
should be regarded as having elected to retain it unless lie uses
speedy and active diligence, to determine its character, and to
notify the giver that he may protect himself against prior parties.
in Gamidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373, a party who kept broken
bank-bills seven days without action was held estopped. In Jenvfon v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355, this rule of diligence was applied
where a debtor had endorsed a note as collateral security, and it
was not protested as against him. In Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen,
11 Mich. 501, and Pkwanix Ins. Co. v. Gray, 13 Mich. 191, it
was held, a party receiving sight paper was bound to forward it
without any delay beyond what was necessary in the ordinary
The rule
course of business, or compelled by circumstances.
gathered from the cases by Mr. Edwards is that in regard to forged
paper also, there must be no "unnecessary delay :" Edwards on
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Bills 207, 551. It is entirely safe to say that a person taking
such paper, should not without some adequate excuse retain such
paper without action, beyond such time as would give him reasonable opportunity to inform himself without inconvenience, or a
neglect of other business to attend to it. The necessity for
promptness exists in all cases, and where it appears there has been
any delay beyond what was reasonably adequate under the circumstances, to enable the party to inform himself, he should not recover. And there should be some care in the taking as well aa
afterwards.
In the present case, it appeared from plaintiff's testimony that
he kept this money on his person more than five months, without
at any time attempting to obtain the opinion of any banker upon
it, although several times where he had the means of doing so. It
certainly can never be contemplated that a person, whatever may be
the extent of his dealings, can keep alive the liability of another
upon paper taken from him, without some use of his opportunities for
information. And when it affirmatively appears that he has neglected his opportunities, there is no question left for a jury. And
in such cases, therefore, the facts being clear, the result is one of
law.
The court should have granted the request to that effect, and it
becomes unnecessary to decide the question whether the payment
when honestly made and without suspicious circumstances would
have been absolute, if diligence had been used to discover the
quality of the paper.

Supreme Court of Miss8ssippi.
LASLY v. PHIPPS.
The obligation of a contract is the legal duty of performing it according to its
terms.
There can be no legal duty without a remedy or means of enforcing it; for without
such remedy a contract is a mere imperfect obligation, depending for its performance upon the will of him from whom performance is expected. Parties
therefore, who enter into contracts, must be considered as looking to the
municipal law for a remedy to secure performance, and this law thus enters into
and forms a part of the obligation.
Whilst a state, in the exercise of its undoubted power to prescribe forms of
action and modes of procedure, may alter and modify the remedy as it existed
at the time a contract was made, yet it is under a duty imposed by that clause of
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the Federal Constitution which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing
the obligation of contracts, if it interfere at all, to leave in existence a remedy as
efficient and substantial as that which subsisted when the contract was made : For
the remedy being necessarily inseparable from the obligation, any law which
clogs it with conditions and restrictions which materially impair its efficiency,
and which did not exist when the contract was made, impairs necessarily the obligation.
The right to seize and sell by judicial process a debtor's property in satisfaction
of a judgment against him, is a material part of the remedy for the enforcement
of the contract on which the judgment is founded ; and any law of a state which
materially increases the amount of property exempt by law from execution over
the amount allowed when the contract was made, impairs the remedy materially,
and is therefore prohibited by the Federal Constitution.
The exemption law of Mississippi passed in 1865 which increased the homestead
exemption from 160 acres of land, not exceeding $1500 in value, to 240 acres
regardless of its value, is, when applied to debts created before its passage,
in violation of that clause of the Federal Constitution which prohibits states from
passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

TtP case sufficiently appears in the opinion of the court, which
was delivered by
SIMRALL, J. [After disposing of some minor points].-It
remains to be considered whether tile homestead shall be assigned under the law in force at the date of incurring the debts,
or under the subsequent statute of 1865. Several cases are before us involving this question which have been ably argued, viz.:
Pennington v. Seal et al., Youngue et al. v. Carroll, Hoy & Co.,
and Gallagher v. Me (auley. Aware of its importance and delicacy, we have'given to it careful consideration. The later statute
having largely increased the exemption, the argument on the one
side is that it impairs the obligation of the contract, and is therefore void and inoperative as to all debts existing at the date of its
enactment; whilst for the debtor it is claimed to be legitimate
legislation which affects the remedy and does not disturb the
contract.
The restrictions on the legislative power of the states contained
in the Federal Constitution, are founded on the motive of sbielding
the people in their persons and property from the effect of legislation arising and impulse caused by unusual emergencies, to which
communities like individuals are exposed. They were said by
Chief Justice MARSUALL to be like "a bill of rights for the people."
No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law
impairing the obligation of contracts. The Constitution being the
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supreme law, and the Supreme Court of the United States its
ultimate and authoritative expounder, we must refer to the judgments of that tribunal for the obligatory rule to control our decision. Upon no clause of that instrument has there been so
much discussion, as has been expended to determine what is the
obligation of contracts, and what must be the- character of the
state legislation which impairs it. All would agree that a state
could not abrogate a contract made between two individuals, legal
when entered into. The debatable ground begins most generally
when a law proposing to regulate the remedy is ,challenged for
trenching upon the right. It has never been decided that the
legislative power extends to a modification of the remedy. This
was distinctly stated in the early case of Sturgis v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 122. It is necessary, or there can be no improvement
and amelioration of the remedial machinery of the law. The impossible task has been, and is, to define the limits beyond which
remedial legislation may not go without infringing upon the
"right."
In Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, it was said that a law
which clogs the remedy by conditions and restrictions tending to
diminish the value and amount of the thing recovered, impairs the
right. This language was suggested by the occupant claimant
laws of Kentucky, the validity of which was the subject of controversy. It was further said that if the new remedies materially
impair the right, it is as much a violation of the compact as if
they overturned the right. Chief Justice TANEY in Bronson v.
Kin8ie, 1 How. 311, concurred fully in the rule as thus stated, adding that the "remedy is the part of the municipal law which
protects the rights :ind the obligation by which it enforces and
maintains it." "It i this protection which the (inhibitory) clause
of the Constitution ix ts mainly intended to secure." These principles were again affirmed in Curran v. The State of Kansas et al.,
13 How. 319, and Freeman v. Howe et al., 24 How. 460. Without citing all the cases which consider the subject, we come to the
later ones which hold a sterner and more definite tone. Thus, in
Iran Hoffman v. City, of Quiney, 4 Wallace 550, it was declared
that laws which subsist at the time and place of making the contract which affect its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement, enter into and form a part of it, as much so as if they rested
on the basis of a district agreement. In Planters'Bank v. Sharp,
6 IIow. 327, remarking on the point of how far remedial legisla-
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tion may go, the court say, "It is not a question of degree; it
shall not impair the value of the contract at all." In White v.
Hart, 13 Wallace 653, the doctrine enunciated in " ran H1oflman
v. City of Quincy is reaffirmed, quoting with approbation the
words of the former judgment in which it is stated. In the last
reported ease of Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wallace (1872), the court
use this language: " The legal remedies for the enforcement of a
contract, which belongs to it at the time and place where it is
made, are a part of its obligation. The state may change them
provided the change involves no impairment of a substantial
right. If the act fall within the category last mentioned, it is to
that extent utterly void." Quite as emphatic is the case of TIalker v. Whitelead in the same court, not yet reported.
We have quoted thus freely the language of the court in the
several cases, especially the more recent ones, in order to ascertain
as distinctly as may be the "rule" in the abstract. It will be
observed that instead of relaxation, the later eases cling with
tenacity to the strict integrity of the contract, and repudiate all
legislation which in effect impairs its force and value.
We think the rules deducible from the cases may be reduced to
these formulm:The obligation of a contract is the duty of performance according to its terms, the means of enforcement being a part of the
obligation, which the states.cannot by legislation impair. The
municipal law enters into and forms part of this obligation; and
to that, parties must be considered as referring in order to enforce
performance.
Whilst the state may modify the remedy, it is under a duty, if
it interferes at all, to provide a remedy as sufficient and substantial as that subsisting when the contract was made. The remedy
is inseparable from the obligation, otherwise the contract would be
of the nature of those imperfect obligations or moral duties subject
Whilst the state is
to the mere caprice and will of individuals.
free to alter the remedy, to prescribe the modes of suit and process, it cannot clog it with conditions and restrictions so as materially to impair its efficiency.
We will recur to a few of the more pertinent cases in order to
see the application of those principles to remedial laws called in
question as impairing the contract.
In Bronson v. Kinsie, 3 How. 297, after the execution of the
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mortgage in question, the legislature of Illinois passed a law requiring mortgaged property to bring two-thirds of its appraised
value, and allowed to the mortgagor a year after the sale, to redeem. These new conditions upon the pre-existing remedy were
held to impair the right. In McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How.
608, a law requiring property sold under execution to produce
two-thirds of its appraisement was declared for the same reason to
be inoperative and void. A -law of Illinois allowed the city of
Quincy to issue and negotiate coupon bonds, but required the city
to levy a sufficient tax to pay the coupons. A subsequent legislature so restricted the power of taxation that enough money could
not be raised to meet the obligations. The last law was held to
be void: Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wallace. Gunn v. Barry,
15 Wallace, is essentially like the case here presented.
The Constitution of Georgia very largely increased the amount
and value of property exempted from execution. The court held that
the law manifestly impaired the obligation of the contract. In
that case the creditor had reduced his debt to judgment, which
was a lien upon the property. The law withdrew from liability a
part of the property upon which the lien had attached. Whilst
the court remark upon this fact, it is plain that the result would
have been the same, had there been no judgment and lien when.
the law went into effect. In Walker v. Whitehead, not yet reported, after the contract in suit had been made, the legislature
imposed certain taxes upon such choses in action, to be paid
annually, and declared as a condition precedent to the right of
suit, among other things, "that the said debt has been regularly
given in for taxes, and the taxes paid ;" held that these conditions
impaired the obligation, and were void.
Most of the laws which have been condemned and declared invalid, operated upon the final process after judgment was obtained.
The Illinois statutes were meant doubtless to prevent a sacrifice of
the debtor's property ; and only delayed the collection of the debt,
if the property fell short of realizing two-thirds of its appraisement at its first offer for sale. But the creditor had a right to the
absolute sale of the mortgaged premises, or of the property under
execution when the contract was formed. These subsequent conditions embarrassed his remedy, rendering it substantially less
valuable. If such laws may be set aside, what vindication can be
made of a statute which withdraws altogether from liability twice
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or thrice as much property as was exempted when the debt was
contracted? The lesson of the adjudications is, that the creditor
may trust to the law as it is when he contracts, to know how much
of the estate of the debtor he may look to for satisfaction. The
existing law is in the contemplation of both parties. That furnishes approximately a safe basis of credit. If subsequent law
may come in, and deny satisfaction out of half the property befbre
liable, it is too plain for argument or illustration, that such a
statute Seriously impairs the right.
There is hardly room for doubt that the greatly enlarged exomptions under the Act of 1865, come within the range and condemnation of these principles. This will be manifest by comparing the law of 1857 with that of 1865. The former exempted
the lands and building occupied as a residence, not exceeding one
hundred and sixty acres in quantity, and $1500 in value, including
the improvements. The latter exempted 240 acres regardless of
its value, so laid off as to include the dwelling-house and other
buildings, and the farm. The homestead as thus defined, would
in all probability equal half the value of the larger landed estates.
Upon a critical examination it might perhaps turn out that half of
the land estates of the freeholders of the state were placed entirely
beyond the reach of creditors. It would embrace both in quantity
and value more than half of the cultivated lands. The effect of
the law in many instances is to free from debt property worth ten
or twenty thousand dollars, to place many debtors in comparatively
affluent circumstances beyond the reach of the smallest creditor.
Credits predicated on the basis of the law of 1857 may be perfectly
solvent, and yet by the Act of 1865 rendered insolvent. Such
would be the consequences if the statute shall be construed to
apply to pre-existing debts.
We would have no doubt or hesitation in declaring this statute
void as to pre-existing debts, because of the inhibition of the
Constitution, but for the embarrassment caused by the case of
Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 130. Mrs. Osborne as widow
claimed the exempt personal property under the Act of 1865, her
husband having died since its passage. This claim was contested
upon the ground, as stated in the answer to her petition, that she
had by a deed of separation from her husband renounced all her
rights and claims upon his estate. It does not appear from the
report that a concession of her demand would have injured the
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creditors. It was conceded by her counsel in his brief, that the
law was unconstitutional as to pre-existing creditors. Her right
was predicated in argument on the fact that the estate was solvent,
indebted not exceeding $500, and that her husband died after the
law was in force. The question was not whether the law was void
because it impaired the obligation of contracts; but rather whether
the widow could take the personal property exempted by the statute
in force at the death of the husband. It may not have been necessary to decide this question to pass upon the validity of thip law as
to prior creditors. What was said in argument by the court on the
last point, entitled as it is to the highest respect and consideration,
might be accepted as dicta. We are strongly inclined to the
opinion that the enlarged homestead as defined in the Act of 1865
is prospective-allowable against after-incurred liabilities. By
express words, the homestead, under the Act of 1857, may be
claimed against future debts. The Act of 1865 imports by its
title to be an amendment of the existing laws. That purpose is
clearly set forth in the 7th section, "that this act shall be construed
as amendatory of the exemption laws of this state, and not intended
to repeal the said laws, otherwise than that the amendments shall
supersede the former acts, so herein revised and amended." The
amendments mainly are an increase and description of the property;
and directions as to preferring the claim, and settling doubts as to
the right claimed. The prospective feature of the former law is
not repeated by express words. If accomplished at all, it is by
implication. Such repeals are not favored nor tolerated except for
inconsistency and repugnance. Courts ought to assume that the
legislature have declared how far the repeal shall extend, and will
not enlarge it by implication, unless there is plain inconsistency
and incompatibility; moreover a statute should be so construed
as that it may-have effect. It is never to be inferred that the
legislature intended to transcend the limits of its power. Statutes
should be so interpreted if the language and subject-matter will
admit of it, as to conform to the fundamental law. A rendering
which will harmonize with the Constitution should be adopted,
rather than one which shall be repugnant to it. In Gunn v.
Barry, 15 Wallace, the intimation is strong, that the law of
Georgia, which is much like our statute of 1865, was prospective
in its effects-the state court, however, had decided otherwise.
Accepting the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Uniited

LASLY v. PHIPPS.

States, as conclusive authority upon constitutional questions, we
are constrained to the conclusion that the adjudications of that
court condemn the increased exemptions of 1865, so far as prior
creditors are affected, as violative of the Constitution. It was
observed by the court in Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss., that it
had not met with an authority in which the constitutionality of
exemption laws was raised and decided. Since that decision the
case reported in 15 Wallace has been adjudged-and also a very
well considered case reported in 22 Grattan 266.
To dissent from a former judgment pronounced in this court is
always attended with serious embarrassment. It should never be
done, until mature reflection had engendered the clearest conviction. But in cases like this we are subordinate to the Supreme
Court of the United States; and must receive the expositions of
.the Constitution by that tribunal as authoritative and binding
upon us.
As a court it is our duty to pronounce the law-we cannot,
however, close our eyes to the consequences of our judgments;
as they may affect the business and social interests of the community. We believe with confidence, that the conclusion to which
we have come will promote public good. The principle vindicated,
will give stability and uniformity to the business and industries of
the people. Individuals in their dealings and transactions will be
governed in their credits and liabilities by a surer and more permanent standard. It may serve to check somewhat the disposition to risky speculation; and inculcate a sterner morality to
respect the inviolability of contracts.
It plainly teaches the lesson of self-reliance, and self-dependence, as a rule of conduct in business, and a better means of extrication out of embarrassments than periodic appeals to legislative power, to interpose for relief.
We are of the opinion that on the case made in the pleadings,
Mrs. Phipps is entitled to a homestead exemption, to be assigned
to her according to the provisions of the law of 1857 as to quantity
and value, and that this assignment may be made in this suit.
The decree of the Chancery Court in sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the bill is reversed; the demurrer is overruled, and
the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
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Where an execution-creditor purchases at execution-sale, and his judgment is
subsequently reversed and restitution awarded, tle title revests in the executiondebtor, but where, before the reversal, the execution-creditor conveys to a stranger
who purchases in good faith, he will hold the title unaffected by the reversal.
An exception to this rule is where the property sold is one that is exempt from
sale by the Homestead Act. In such case the purchaser acquiring no title can
convey none even to a stranger.
Homestead laws should be liberally construed, with the view of promoting the
benevolent purpose of securing to a family, a home protected from the creditors of
the person who is its head.
Tie homestead exemption is for the benefit of the family, and a sale thereof
under execution is void. The exemption need not be claimed, and the possession
and use of property, as a homestead, are notice to the officer making a levy that
it is held as such.
When the homestead exceeds in amount or value the statutory limitation, it is
the duty of the officer holding an execution, before making a levy, to proceed
under the provisions of the statute to have the homestead appraised and set apart.
The conveyance and repurchase of a homestead, without a relinquishment of
possession, even though made in fraud of creditors, does not constitute an abandonment of the homestead.
The sale of a homestead under execution will be restrained in equity, on the
ground that it will cast a cloud over the title of the owner.

Tiiis was an application for an injunction to restrain Montgomery, a trustee in a deed of trust from Nussberger for the benefit of Shields, from selling the lot conveyed in the deed, on the
general ground that such sale would cast a cloud on the title of
plaintiff.
The facts appeared to be as follows: Vogler acquired the lot
and house in the year 1865. Nussberger obtained a judgment
against Vogler about the 4th of February 1868. A few days
previous to this Vogler conveyed the premises to one Suess, and
on January 23d 1869, Suess conveyed back the same to Vogler.
On Nussberger's judgment an execution issued; the lot was sold
under it, and Nussberger became the purchaser, and a deed from
the sheriff to him was executed, bearing date August 6th 1868,

and recorded November 6th 1868.

There was a mistake in the

description of the boundaries of the lot in the deed, as there was

in the deed by which it was acquired by Vogler, and a second
execution was obtained and levied on the lot, and a sale made under
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it to Nussberger, who received a. Fecond deed from the sheriff,
dated 20th of August 1869, with a correct description of the
boundaries of the lot.
At or previous to this second sale the sheriff was notified that
Vogler claimed the lot as his homestead. No claim had been asserted at the first sale under execution. Vogler was married and
had four children, and he and his family lived on the premises.
The judgment under which these sales were made was reversed
on the 24th of December, 1869. The deed from Nussberger to
Montgomery for the benefit of Shields was made on the 16th of
December 1869.
The petition in this case set forth these facts and asked an injunction to prevent Mlontgomery from selling under his deed of
trust. The court below granted the injunction.
Johnson & Botsford, for Vogler.-1. A sheriff's sale and deed
of a homestead are void; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 506; Hamblin v. Wforneke, 31 Texas 681; Kendall v. Clark, 10 Cal. 17;
Ackley v. Chamberl&in,16 Cal. 181; and the sale cannot be sustained on. the ground that the homestead exceeds the amount in
value, limited by law: Hjers v. Ford, 22 Wis. 139; Cook v. MeChristian, 4 Cal. 23.
2. The possession by respondent and his family, of the land in
controversy, was notice to the world of his homestead right ; Cook
v. TbIehristan, 4 Cal. 23; Tylor v. .Hargous,Id. 268; Holden
v..Pinney, 6 Cal. 234; and he was not required to give the sheriff
actual notice of such right: Wagner Statutes 697, § 1; Pardie
v. Lindley, 31 Ill. 187.
3. A conveyance of a homestead without a removal therefrom
by the owner and family, does not constitute an abandonment of
the homestead, and a repurchase thereof reinvests the homestead
right, and will be held as though the same had never been conveyed: 1 Wagn. Statutes 699, § 8; Tamlin v. Siwiney, 22 Ark.
400; Horgan v. Stearnes, 41 Verm. 398; Locke v. Bowel, 47
N. H. 46; 1 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 706, 711, 712; Pishback Y.
Lane, 36 Ill. 437; Joes v. Mills, 37 Ill. 73; _4'oore v. Dunning,
29 Ill. 130 ; Lamb v. Shay, 14 Iowa 570; Dearing v. Thomas, 25
Geo. 224; Cox v. Wilder, 2 Dill. C. C. 45; 1?ix v. Capitol Bank,
Id. 367; Bartholomew v. WVest, Id. 290.
4. A sale by Montgomery would draw a hurtful cloud over the
title of respondents, and will be restrained by a court of equity.
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Philips & Vest, for Montgomery et al.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The principal grounds upon which an injunction
is asked are: First, that the reversal of the judgment destroyed
the title of Nussberger under the execution sales, and, secondly,
that Vogler's claim of the property as a homestead rendered the
sale and purchase of Nussberger a nullity; and these are the only
questions of importance, whether it be held that it was a case for
injunction or not.
There is no question that- a reversal of a judgment does not
invalidate sales under executions to strangers who purchase at the
sale, but as to parties to the judgment the law seems to be settled
otherwise; and if they become purchasers they take a title subject
to the ultimate disposition of the case. In this case the plaintiff
in the judgment buys and of course his title is affected by the
infirmity, but he conveys to a third person before the judgment is
reversed, and the question is whether this infirmity attaches to the
purchaser. In Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 420, the court excepted
the case where some third person has acquired a "1collateral right
before reversal." The purchaser in such cases must be regarded
as a purchaser without notice, since he buys from a party who
derives title from a judgment and execution valid at the time, and
really occupies the same position as if he had himself bought at
the sheriff's sale. Whilst therefore the title of the plaintiff in the
execution would be annulled by the reversal of the judgment, the
sale or conveyance by the plaintiff to a third person before the
reversal of the judgment would be valid, and the purchaser, supposing the purchase to be in good faith, would be protected from
the risks which his vendor would be subject to. In this case the
deed to Montgomery was made four days before the reversal of the
judgment under which Nussberger bought, and, so far as this point
is concerned, he must be regarded as having acquired a good title.
But it is further objected that the sheriff's sale was void because
of the property being claimed as a homesteal, and therefore protected from execution by our statute on that sulject.
The construction of our homestead laws, 1 Wagner's Statutes,
p. 697, has never so far as I have observed been before this court;
so we are left to resort to the general practice of all courts in construing obscure and doubtful provisions of a statute to carry out as
NAPTON,
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nearly as possible what is believed to be its main scope and design,
and in this we may be guided to some extent by adjudications in
other states where similar laws have long existed. It seems too
well settled in the various courts in" states where the homestead law
has been discussed, that such laws, being prompted by benevolent
intentions, are to be liberally construed, and in such way as to
promote the design of securing to a family a home protected from
the creditors of the person who is its head.
It is easy to foresee or imagine cases in which the ministerial
officers, who are to be governed by it, must be greatly embarrassed
in regard to their duty in executing some of its provisions, but I
do not propose to anticipate difficulties which may not occur or
which future legislation may remove.
The points which arise on the present record have been mostly
passed on by courts of the last resort having similar statutes to
ours.
Our statute limits the homestead in Sedalia where this case
originated, to thirty square rods of ground in extent, and in value
not to exceed $1500. The second section of the act allows the
housekeeper or head of the family in cases where the limitation is
exceeded either as to quantity or value, to designate or choose such
part as will not exceed the limitation, and provides tlat where
there is such designation or choice, or where there is none made,
in either event the sheriff shall appoint three appraisers to fix the
boundaries and location of the homestead, and that the sheriff shall
then proceed with the levy of the execution on the residue of the
real estate.
We infer from this section that in a case where a homestead is
claimed, the sheriff cannot proceed with the levy until he has thus
appointed appraisers; nor does it seem to be material whether the
housekeeper or the head of the family asserts his claim or not.
It may be that he is absent. This law is for the benefit of the
family, the wife and children as well as the head of the family.
The occupancy of the house as a family residence is a fact easily
ascertained by the officer. He cannot proceed with his levy until
he has ascertained in the mode directed by the act, the extent and
the value of the premises, and that it is beyond the limit protected
against executions.
The question of the title, we suppose, was not to be investigated
by the sheriff. If the householder had no title the execution and

